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ABSTRACT
The conﬁguration data sequence of a ﬁeld programmable
gate array (FPGA) is an intellectual property (IP) of the
original designer. With the increase in deployment of
FPGAs in modern embedded systems, the IP protec-
tion of FPGA hardware designs has become a neces-
sary requirement for many IP vendors. There have been
already many proposals to overcome this problem us-
ing symmetric encryption techniques but these methods
need a cryptographic key to be stored in a non-volatile
memory located on FPGA or in a battery-backed RAM
(Random Access Memory) as done in some of the cur-
rent FPGAs. The expenses with the proposed meth-
ods are, occupation of larger area on FPGA in the for-
mer case and limited lifetime of the device in the lat-
ter. In contrast, we propose a novel method which
combines the dynamic partial reconﬁguration (dynamic
PR) feature of an SRAM-based FPGA with the pub-
lic key cryptography (PKC) to protect the FPGA con-
ﬁguration ﬁles without the need to store any keys on
FPGA. Using our method, not only the high-end FP-
GAs but also the low-end FPGAs with partial reconﬁg-
uration capabilities are secured. The proposed method
has been implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA plat-
form.
Index Terms— FPGA, bitstream, Public Key Cryp-
tography, Dynamic Partial Reconﬁguration, IP, Embed-
ded Systems
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, static-random-access-memory-based
(SRAM-based) FPGAs are becoming increasingly pop-
ular as building blocks of electronic systems because of
advantages such as easy design modiﬁcation (reconﬁg-
urability), rapid prototyping, economical cost for low
volume production, lower startup cost in comparison to
fully-customized application-speciﬁc-integrated-circuits
(ASICs), and availability of sophisticated design and
debugging tools. Applications of FPGAs in the area
of consumer electronics include, for example, televi-
sion circuits, communication & video processing de-
vices and software-deﬁned radios.
Thanks to CASED for funding.
Since FPGAs are becoming so important for the
electronic industry, it is necessary to think about the se-
curity of FPGA-based systems. Two possible security
measures include are, protecting the FPGA data and the
FPGA design itself. In the former case it is necessary
to protect the FPGA application i.e., the data inside the
circuit and the data transferred to/from the peripheral
circuits during the communication. Whereas in the lat-
ter, the concerns are against cloning and reverse engi-
neering which is the IP protection problem. Concern-
ing SRAM-based FPGAs it corresponds to the way to
protect the bitstream so the FPGA conﬁguration. In
essence, the problem of design security is simple, the
designer doesn’t want that a competitor could be able
to pirate his design.
There are two types of piracy: cloning and reverse
engineering. Cloning is when a competitor makes a
copy of the design, and when he is able to make a copy
of the pirated system. With FPGAs it is very simple
to clone an unprotected design as the bitstream can be
copied to another FPGA’s conﬁguration memory. In
case of reverse engineering the design is copied by re-
constructing a schematic or netlist level representation;
in this process he understands how the design works
and how to improve it, or to modify it with malicious
intent. So the reverse engineering is more serious than
cloning. These two correspond to different attacks, and
the design security must protect the system against both
these attacks. There are two types of attacks: non-
invasive and invasive.
• The non-invasive attacks gather all the methods
that use external means. For example the attack-
ers can use all the possibilities of the circuit in-
puts in order to obtain all the different outputs
and draw the system truth table, this method is
called “black box” attack. In case of an SRAM-
based FPGA a simple attack method can be, in-
tercepting the bitstream between the root ROM
and the FPGA when the power is switched on.
More complex attacks can use power and elec-
tromagnetic changes and measures like the sim-
ple or differential power analysis [1].
• The invasive attacks (- or physical attacks) are
characterized by the necessity to destroy the inte-
grated circuit (component package) to study the
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chip (design inside the component) using some
complex methods. For example, it is possible
to use a laser cutter microscope in order to split
the chip in several slices and understand the chip
layout. These attacks can use sophisticated tools
like optical microscope, mechanical probes and
even focused ion beam (FIB). As these attacks
use the weakness of the silicon technology, when
they are possible, it is very hard to secure the sys-
tem against them.
The papers [2] and [3] give some information about
these different attacks. In this paper we consider the
protection of FPGA conﬁguration ﬁles against the non-
invasive attacks only. The rest of this paper is orga-
nized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview about
the related work done to address the problem of FPGA
conﬁguration ﬁle protection. Section 3 brieﬂy explains
the dynamic PR supported by the state of the art FP-
GAs and an overview about the PKC while Section 4
lists the objectives to be achieved with the assumed sce-
nario and describes our own methodology to protect
the FPGA bitstreams using dynamic PR and PKC. In
section 5, an analysis of the implementation results is
given while section 6 concludes the paper by giving an
outlook into the future work.
2. RELATED WORK
There are generally two approaches possible to address
the problem of FPGA IP protection. The ﬁrst solution
to protect the device against the piracy is the legal so-
lution. The deﬁnition of efﬁcient laws, the regulation
and the management of intellectual properties are parts
of this solution. The second proposal to improve the
security level of SRAM-based FPGAs is by bitstream
encryption. In this section we mostly address the re-
lated work done using the second approach only. For
example, Xilinx Virtex series devices support conﬁgu-
ration with an encrypted bitstream. Virtex devices have
a built-in bitstream decryption unit on them. Virtex-II
and Virtex-II Pro support Triple data encryption stan-
dard (Triple-DES) [4] with a 56-bit key, while Virtex-4
and Virtex-5 support AES [5] with a 256-bit key. The
secret key is stored in a dedicated volatile memory in-
side the FPGA which must always be supplied with
power through an external battery, which limits the life-
time of the device. Additionally, the on-board decryp-
tion unit and the corresponding key occupy a consider-
able amount of space which is very crucial in embed-
ded system design.
In order to overcome the problem of an additional
battery in Xilinx’s solution, Tom Kean of the Algo-
tronix society proposed ideas to store the cryptographic
secret key on FPGA, like using laser to program a set of
links during manufacture [6]. However, in his method
the encryption and decryption circuits are embedded
inside the FPGA which causes less available silicon
area for developed applications. Also, the encryption
and decryption circuits are ﬁxed, so it is not possible
to upgrade them. In contrast, Kun-Wah Yip et al. pro-
posed the IP protection scheme using partial-encryption
(PE) technique [7]. Their method argues that the PE
technique outperforms the full-encryption technique in
terms of the reverse engineering cost. Whereas, Jorge
Guajardo et al. proposed a different scheme, using
FPGA’s intrinsic physical unclonable functions (PUF)
and PKC for IP protection. Though their method uses
PKC-based authentication protocol which does not need
the private key to be stored on the FPGA, they did not
make use of the advantages provided by partial recon-
ﬁguration. In addition the PUF implementation and its
analysis on an FPGA is in itself a challenging task [8].
There are other techniques proposed for FPGA IP
protection like watermarking as in John Lach et al.,
where they apply a watermark to the physical layout of
a digital circuit when it is mapped onto an FPGA which
uniquely identiﬁes the circuit origin and yet difﬁcult to
detect [9]. In contrast, Tim Gu¨neysu et al. used both
public-key and symmetric key cryptography to dynam-
ically protect the IP of circuits in conﬁguration ﬁles.
In their method the symmetric cryptography is hard-
wired and the public-key functionality is moved into a
temporary conﬁguration bitstream for a one-time setup
procedure [10]. Also, Bossuet et al. proposed a scheme
where an embedded key is accessible to the user logic
and uses partial reconﬁguration to encrypt and decrypt
the bitstream [11]. An on-chip key is used to encrypt
the main design’s bitstream before storing it in a PROM
where a decryption bitstream is also stored to decrypt
the encrypted bitstream in the ﬁeld. The ﬂaw of this
scheme is that if the key is accessible to the user logic
anyone can read it and decrypt the bitstream.
As mentioned above, all the methods need a secret
key to be stored on an FPGA which in itself is a chal-
lenge in SRAM-based FPGAs as the memory on these
devices is volatile. In contrast, we can store the keys
in a non-volatile memory placed on an FPGA, but this
has two drawbacks: One being necessity for an extra
space on FPGA, which is crucial for embedded sys-
tems as they are area constrained, and the other being
the possible extraction of stored cryptographic keys by
an attacker which makes the device less secure. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, the idea of using dy-
namic PR and PKC for FPGA bitstream protection has
not yet been addressed. Our method utilizes the special
feature of SRAM-based FPGAs, the partial reconﬁgu-
ration, and the public key cryptography to protect the
FPGA bitstreams.
The novelty of our method is that it does not need
any ﬁxed key storage for encryption and decryption of
bitstreams as the keys are generated on the ﬂy. There
is no threat of the private key being stolen, as it is
stored (temporarily) deep inside memory blocks which
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are erased when the device is turned off. Also, as the
keys for encryption and decryption of bitstreams are
generated on the FPGA, unlike the single symmetric
key in previously referenced papers, and sent to the
host for bitstream (IP) encryption it is possible to ad-
dress the problem of loading IPs from different ven-
dors. Different vendors can use on the ﬂy generated
keys to encrypt their IPs, before sending them to the
FPGA for secure deployment in the ﬁeld, which means
that they will all be placed on a single System-on-Chip
(SoC).
3. DYNAMIC PR IN SRAM-BASED FPGAS
3.1. Partial Reconﬁguration Overview
Some of the SRAM-based FPGAs support a special
feature called partial reconﬁguration (PR) in which a
portion of the FPGA’s fabric is reconﬁgured while the
rest resumes its work. The portion being reconﬁgured
is the reconﬁgurable (dynamic) part and the portion re-
suming the work is the static part. If the conﬁguration
of the FPGA is changed at run-time i.e., the system is
neither stopped nor switched off, then its called as dy-
namic PR. Additionally, if the system triggers the re-
conﬁguration by itself then it is a self-reconﬁgurable
systemwhich does not require the use of internal FPGA
infrastructure. The area of the FPGA that is reconﬁg-
ured is called the partially reconﬁgurable region (PRR).
A PRR typically consists of a number of conﬁgurable
logic blocks (CLBs) and functional blocks. The mod-
ule to be placed inside the PRR is called a partially re-
conﬁgurable module (PRM), which is the speciﬁc con-
ﬁguration of the PRR and at least two PRMs are needed
per PRR. In many cases the assignment of PRMs to
PRR is ﬁxed (non-relocatable) though in principle, a
PRM may be conﬁgured to different PRRs.
PRM1
PRM2
PRR
FPGA
Fig. 1. Partial Reconﬁguration in FPGAs
In ﬁgure 1, we see that two PRMs which are mu-
tually exclusive in time will be placed in the PRR in-
side the FPGA i.e., only one PRM can be assigned to
a given PRR at a given time. The remaining region in
the FPGA which is outside the PRR is the static region,
where the application which needs to be run uninter-
ruptedly, is placed. The conﬁguration ﬁles placed in the
PRR are called as partial bitﬁles. In FPGAs support-
ing dynamic PR, single conﬁguration units can be read,
modiﬁed and written. For example in Xilinx FPGAs,
different Virtex-Series support different PR schemes.
Virtex-II/Virtex-II Pro supported initially column-based
and later also tile-based PR. The high-end FPGAs like
Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 support tile-based PR only. The
partial reconﬁguration of an FPGA is done through the
internal conﬁguration access port (ICAP), a built-in hard
core IP module available on the FPGA. ICAP gives
internal access to Select MAP conﬁguration interface
and can process every bitﬁle that could also be used
externally. The ICAP module is controlled by the soft-
ware driver for the processor on the FPGA. In our sce-
nario, the static logic contains the asymmetric algo-
rithm (RSA or ECC), which generates the public-private
key pair. The reconﬁgurable logic is populated with the
partial bitstreams, which are the actual FPGA applica-
tions to be implemented, after an on-board decryption
process.
3.2. Public Key Cryptography Overview
Public key cryptography uses asymmetric key algorithms
like RSA and ECC. Unlike symmetric key algorithms,
they do not require a secure initial exchange of key be-
tween the sender and the receiver. The asymmetric key
algorithms are used to create a mathematically related
key pair: a secret private key and a published pub-
lic key. Messages are encrypted with the recipient’s
public key and can only be decrypted with the corre-
sponding private key, which is known only to the re-
ceiver. Using the above idea, in our scenario the host
PC (sender), which has the stored bitﬁles to be loaded
on to the FPGA (receiver), encrypts them with the pub-
lic key received from the FPGA and sends them back to
the FPGA, which decrypts the bitﬁles with the private
key located on-board, and triggers the conﬁguration.
4. PR AND PKC BASED FPGA BITSTREAM
PROTECTION
4.1. Assumptions for the Proposed Model
The main objective of the proposed scheme is to protect
the FPGA conﬁguration ﬁles without the ﬁxed storage
of keys in/out of FPGA. We prefer SRAM-based FP-
GAs over Flash-based as the latter are not in common
use yet. The assumed scenario for the proposed scheme
is inhouse, i.e., the PC and the FPGA are directly con-
nected to each other. It is assumed that there is no ad-
versary, who is trying to intercept the communication
channel between the host PC and the FPGA. But if the
loading of the bitstream from a remote area over the
Internet is to be considered, then there is a possibility
of several attacks such as the well-known “man-in-the-
middle” attack. Here, the attacker can pose himslef to
be the FPGA and send his own public key to the host
PC. Thereby, decrypting the incoming bitstream with
his generated private key, sufﬁcient to unveil the appli-
cation to be run on the FPGA.
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4.2. Methodology
A very secure method for protecting the FPGA conﬁg-
uration ﬁles can be built when PR and PKC are com-
bined. By using these two basic methods we propose
a novel technique to protect FPGA IP without the need
to store any cryptographic keys in a dedicated storage.
In ﬁgure 2, we see that all of the functions in the “blue
colored box” can be implemented with in the physical
package of the FPGA. The plaintext and the private key
information never leave a well-protected container i.e.,
the security boundary.
Public Key
Private Key
f
f
Plaintext
Ciphertext
Plaintext
Key Generation
Security Boundary
Fig. 2. Asymmetric Key Encryption
The architecture of the proposed method is outlined
in ﬁgure 4 and the corresponding communication pro-
tocol is given in ﬁgure 3. The considered FPGA sup-
ports the dynamic PR, and we divide the FPGA’s logic
into two parts: static area and dynamic area. The initial
bitﬁle (full bitstream) to be loaded onto the FPGA in
the static area is an unencrypted design that does not
feature any proprietary information. It only contains
the algorithm to generate the public-private key pair
and the interface between the host, FPGA, and ICAP.
The conﬁguration of the FPGA is done according to the
protocol illustrated in ﬁgure 3.
Following advantages result from using the proposed
scheme:
• The public-private key pair may be regenerated
at any time. If a new conﬁguration is down-
loaded from the host it may be encrypted with a
different public key and decrypted with the cor-
responding new private key. Even if the FPGA
is conﬁgured with the same partial bitﬁle later,
such as after a power-on-reset, a different public
key pair is used even though it is the same bitﬁle.
• There is no need of any non-volatile memory to
store the key (as for symmetric keys in previ-
ously mentioned schemes) for decrypting the bit-
ﬁles as the private key is generated on the ﬂy. In
addition, the private key generated by the asym-
metric algorithm running on the FPGA is stored
in the SRAM and if the FPGA loses power then
the private key no longer exists.
• In general, the partial bitﬁle contains the vast ma-
jority of the FPGA design with the logic in the
Host (PC) FPGA
Bitﬁle Library
(full and partial) Send the full
bitstream
Conﬁgure FPGA
with full bitstream
(RSA/ECC)
Generate public-
private key pair
Request the
public key
Send the
public key
Encryprt the partial
bitﬁle with the
public key
Send the encrypted
partial bitﬁle
Decrypt the partial
bitﬁle with the
private key
Conﬁgure the FPGA
with the partial
bitﬁle using ICAP
Fig. 3. Protocol for secure FPGA Conﬁguration
Static Logic (full bitﬁle)
Generate Key Pair
Public
Key
Private
Key
External
Interface
Decrypt
Process
Dynamic Logic
(partial bitﬁle)
ICAP
Host (PC)
FPGA
Bitﬁle
Library
Conﬁg1
Conﬁg2
Public
Key
Encrypt
Process
Fig. 4. Loading an encrypted partial Bitﬁle
static design consuming a very small percentage
of the overall FPGA resources. So, most of the
FPGA resources are allocated to the applications.
• Even if at some point of time it is found that the
asymmetric algorithm being used is no more se-
cure, one can replace it with a new algorithm as
it just requires loading a new full bitstream into
the static region of the FPGA.
• Even if the system is stolen and the FPGA re-
mains powered it is extremely difﬁcult to ﬁnd
the private key, because it is stored in the gen-
eral purpose FPGA fabric, but not in a special
purpose register.
• The issue of loading IPs from different vendors
onto a single SoC is addressed.
• This scheme can be applied to low-end FPGAs
too, which support the partial reconﬁguration.
There are also certain disadvantages with this scheme,
like the implementation of asymmetric key algorithm
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Table 1. ECC, AES and RSA Implementations
Algorithm LUTs Registers BRAMs Delay
ECC 2466 1207 2 5.142 ns
AES 853 536 5 3.870 ns
RSA 16319 12080 2 7.442 ns
(RSA) on an FPGA consumes a lot of resources and
the scenario is local with a set of assumptions. Al-
though the generation of partial and full bitstreams for
the FPGA is cost expensive, time expensive, and ex-
hausting at the moment, the FPGA vendors claim that
it will be much easier on top of their newer versions of
tools.
5. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
Algorithms ECC, AES, and RSA have been implemented
on a Xilinx V5LX110T platform and their resource re-
quirements are compared to show the feasibility of im-
plementation of the proposed scheme. The resource
consumption for the algorithms are summarised in ta-
ble 1. Obviously, the number of resources (slice LUTs
and slice registers) occupied by the public key algo-
rithm (RSA) is much higher compared to the symmetric
key algorithm (AES), but the ECC resource consump-
tion is comparable with AES. Also, the calculation time
delay for each of the algorithms is measured at a speed
grade of -1 of the FPGA devices. So, The use of the
ECC algorithm for decrypting the incoming encrypted
partial bitstream instead of on-board AES decryption
unit is justiﬁed with reference to the overall advantages
gained as mentioned in the previous section.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed a novel design method to
protect the FPGA conﬁguration ﬁles which avoids the
need to store the cryptographic keys in registers of the
FPGA or in an external non-volatile memory. The pro-
posed scheme uses the special feature of SRAM-based
FPGAs, i.e., dynamic partial reconﬁguration and the
well-known public key cryptography scheme to secure
the IP of the design. This scheme can be further ex-
tended to secure the IPs supplied from different ven-
dors. The feasibility of implementation of the proposed
scheme on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA platform and some
of the implementation results were presented. As a part
of future work there is a need to reduce the number
of resources being consumed by public key algorithms
through algorithm optimization. In addition, we will
consider how to avoid the man-in-the-middle attack,
which is not addressed in this paper.
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